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SENTENCING

When May aJudge, Instead of aJury,
Find the Facts on Which aCriminal
Sentence IsBased?
by Alichael O'Hear
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Michael O'Hear is an associate
professor of law at Marquette
University Law School in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He is
an editor of the Federal
Sentencing Reporter and the
author of numerous articles on
criminal law and procedure.
Prof. O'Hear can be reached at
michael.ohear@marquette.edu
or (414)288-3587.

ISSUE
Does California's Determinate
Sentencing Law, by permitting sentencing judges to impose enhanced
sentences based on their determination of facts not found by the jury
or admitted by the defendant, violate the constitutional right to jury
fact-finding beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal cases?

FACTS
When California adopted its
Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL)
in the mid-1970s, it was foreshadowing a broad national movement
against judicial discretion in sentencing. Under the DSL, the sentencing judge must usually impose
one of three specified terms of
imprisonment following a felony
conviction. The law further states
that the judge must impose the middle term, unless there are circumstances in ag. ravation or mitigation
of the crime. Cal. Pen. Code
§ 1170(b). Rules of court identify a

nonexhaustive list of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. These
factors may be found by the judge
using the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, as opposed to a
jury using the higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Cal. Rules
of Court, Rule 4.420(b).
Thus, in 2003, when a jury found
John Cunningham guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child, the
judge was left with a choice between
three possible sentences: 6, 12, or
16 years in prison. The judge found
the existence of six aggravating factors: (1) great violence, great bodily
harm, and threat thereof disclosing
a high degree of viciousness and callousness; (2) a vulnerable victim;
(3) a threat of bodily injury to
coerce the victim to recant; (4) taking advantage of a position of trust
or confidence; (5) engaging in violent conduct which indicates a serious danger to society; and (6)
Cunningham's employment as a
police officer. The judge found just
one mitigating factor: the defendant's lack of any prior record.
Finding that the aggravating circum-
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stances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances, the judge bypassed
the middle term of 12 years and
sentenced Cunningham to 16 years.
As other states followed California's
lead in replacing broad, unguided
judicial discretion with sentencing
rules that specified particular consequences for particular findings of
fact, defendants began to argue that
fact-finding at sentencing should be
subject to all of the basic procedural
protections that are constitutionally
required of criminal trials. These
constitutional protections include,
most notably, a right to jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court rejected an
argument of this sort in 1986.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79 (1986). However, an unusual
coalition of some of the Court's
most liberal Justices (Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg) and most
conservative Justices (Scalia and
Thomas) signaled a reversal of
course in 2000. Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Apprendi held that, with just a couple of exceptions, "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
The Apprendi revolution in sentencing procedure reached its
zenith in Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004), which has
been characterized by some experts
as the Court's most important criminal procedure decision in a generation. In Blakely the Court overturned Washington's sentencing
guidelines system. The Washington
guidelines specified a narrow, presumptive sentencing range based on
the jury's findings, but then permitted the judge to impose a sentence
in excess of that range if the judge
found "substantial and compelling
reasons justifying an exceptional

sentence." The Court held that this
process violated Apprendi, refining
the Apprendi rule as follows: "When
a judge inflicts punishment that the
jury's verdict alone does not allow,
the jury has not found all the facts
which the law makes essential to
the punishment, and the judge
exceeds his proper authority."
Blakely thus cast doubt on the constitutionality of the "presumptive"
sentencing systems used in
California and about a dozen other
states. Most of these states responded by changing their sentencing systems, either creating a fact-finding
role for the jury or switching back
to discretionary sentencing.
California, however, did nothing.
Sentenced a few months before
Blakely, John Cunningham was able
to raise the sentencing procedure
issue on appeal. He argued that the
judge in his case unconstitutionally
found the aggravating facts on
which his upper-term sentence was
based. However, in an unpublished
decision, the California Court of
Appeal rejected Cunningham's
Blakely challenge. The court reasoned that the upper term of imprisonment imposed on Cunningham
was within the authorized range of
punishment based on Cunningham's
conviction. In other words, to use
Apprendi's terminology, the judge's
findings of fact did not increase the
penalty for Cunningham's crime
"beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum." Because an upper-term
punishment under the DSL is within
the "statutory maximum," the factfinding necessary to impose the
upper term need not be made by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Cunningham then sought discretionary review in the California
Supreme Court. However, while his
petition was pending, the higher
court also upheld the constitutionality of the DSL scheme against a
Blakely challenge. People v. Black,

113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005).
Thereafter, the California Supreme
Court denied Cunningham's petition. He then successfully sought
review in the United States
Supreme Court.
CASE ANALYSIS
Cunningham argues this case is simply a repeat of Blakely. Just like the
sentencing scheme overturned in
Blakely, the DSL scheme establishes
a standard, middle-of-the-road sen1 tence and requires that the judge
find at least one aggravating circumstance before selecting a term above
the standard sentence. As
Cunningham characterizes the
California system, the jury's verdict
alone does not authorize an upperterm sentence. That sentence can
only be reached through some additional fact-finding. Under Apprendi
and Blakely, Cunningham argues,
such additional fact-finding must be
performed by a jury using the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
The State of California presents a
more complicated argument, which
proceeds along two lines. The state
attempts first to distinguish Blakely
and then second to analogize the
California system to the federal sentencing scheme adopted by the
Court in Booker v. United States,
543 U.S. 220 (2005). In a sense,
then, the state's arguments really
turn on the question of whether the
DSL scheme is closer to the preBlakely Washington system or the
post-Booker federal system.
The state contends that
Cunningham mischaracterizes the
California system. The jury verdict
actually does authorize all three
terms of imprisonment (upper, middle, and lower), and the judge's
selection of any of these three is a
discretionary decision subject to deferential appellate review. The "standard" sentencing range for a crime
(Continued on Page 18)
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thus includes all three terms. The
requirement that there be an aggravating circumstance to justify the
upper term is really just another
way of saying that the sentence
must be reasonable. However, a reasonability requirement does not convert an otherwise discretionary sentencing system into an impermissibly presumptive one. The broad discretion enjoyed by California judges
in selecting the upper term ought to
be distinguished from the more rigorous standards that had to be satisfied for Washington judges to impose
a sentence above that state's standard range.
In arguing that the jury's verdict
alone authorizes an upper-term sentence, the state relies on the
California Supreme Court's opinion
in Black, which upheld the DSL system against a Blakel' challenge.
According to the state, the United
States Supreme Court must defer to
California's highest court when it
comes to interpreting California law.
Cunningham counters that Black
itself acknowledged the key requirement of an aggravating circumstance before an upper-term sentence can be imposed; any characterization of the significance of this
requirement for purposes of federal
constitutional analysis is ultimately
a matter for the United States
Supreme Court, and not a state
court, to decide.
The state also relies on earlier
California decisions that raised barriers to post-conviction review of a
judge's decision to impose an upperterm sentence. Cunningham
responds that these decisions were
pre-Apprendi and, in any event,
addressed different legal questions
than the jury-right question.
Building on its efforts to distinguish
Blakely, the state argues that its
DSL scheme avoids the "'policy concerns" that animated Blakely. For

instance, the DSL does not represent "judicial usurpation of the
jury's role" because the law preserves a role for the jury in finding
facts that are necessary to enhance
a sentence above the upper term.
Nor does the DSL deny defendants
fair notice of their sentencing exposure; the upper term is clearly indicated in the criminal statutes.
The state analogizes the California
system to the post-Booker federal
system. Prior to Booker, federal sentencing was governed by mandatory
guidelines. The guidelines set forth
a host of sentence enhancements.
Judges, not juries, did the factfinding in order to determine which
enhancements applied. Booker held
that this scheme violated Apprendi
and Blakely. By way of a remedy,
Booker declared that the guidelines
would henceforth be merely "advisory," not binding. Appellate courts
would review sentences, not for
strict compliance with the guidelines, but for "reasonableness." The
Court made clear that the modified
federal system, despite its use of
guidelines and appellate review and
its lack of a role for the jury,
nonetheless complied with
Apprendi and Blakely.
The state argues that its system, as
construed by Black, closely parallels
the new federal regime. The state's
middle term establishes a norm that
operates like the recommended sentencing range under the federal
guidelines. California judges, like
their federal counterparts, have
broad, but not quite unlimited, discretion to sentence above the norm.
In both settings, a sentence above
the norm must be reasonable, but
reasonability review does not mean
the sentencing scheme is the sort of
mandatory scheme that must be
accompanied by jury fact-finding.
The state finds support for its analogy in the growing body of postBooker decisions in the lower federal

courts that treat the guidelines range
as "presumptively reasonable."
Cunningham counters that the postBooker system still provides for
more discretion than the DSL.
Booker did not contemplate that
federal judges would necessarily be
required to find an aggravating circumstance in order to impose a sentence above the recommended
guidelines range. To the extent that
post-Booker decisions do indeed
suggest such a requirement,
Cunningham points out that they
are merely lower-court decisions.
The Supreme Court itself has never
endorsed this view of Booker.
SIGNIFICANCE
Cunningham is an extremely
important case-arguably the most
important criminal procedure case
yet confronted by the Roberts
Court. To be sure, the basic question presented by the entire line of
Apprendi cases seems at first to be
a rather arcane matter of procedure:
under what circumstances can factfinding for sentencing purposes be
performed by a judge, as opposed to
a jury? Yet, this procedural issue
turns out to have profound consequences for substantive outcomes.
For one thing, both the folk wisdom
of lawyers and the research of social
scientists indicate that judges and
juries often assess evidence differently. It is not clear whether judges
are, on the whole, tougher on criminal defendants than juries, or vice
versa. But there is little doubt that
in many cases judges and juries will
reach different outcomes. Even
more significant, though, is the
extra time and effort that is
required by lawyers and court personnel when an issue is tried to a
jury. In a criminal justice system
that is already spread thin, recognizing a broader jury-trial right is
apt to reduce the number of cases
that prosecutors can take, cause
prosecutors to be more generous in
Issue No. 1

plea bargaining, and/or result in
fewer sentence enhancements being
imposed. Moreover, in order to deal
with the resource problems, a state
may feel obliged to reinstitute the
sort of highly discretionary sentencing regime that fell out of favor
three decades ago. It is a matter of
intense debate whether these sorts
of changes are desirable, but they
are surely momentous.
Within the broader context of the
Apprendi revolution, Cunningham
may prove significant in at least
four respects. First and most obviously, Cunningham may result in a
determination that the nation's
largest state-level criminal justice
system is operating day-in and dayout in violation of the Constitution.
This would cause considerable
short-term instability and confusion, as the state courts try to sort
out the scope of the ruling, decide
which defendants were entitled to a
resentencing, and establish new procedures to bring the state into compliance with the constitutional mandate. Over the long term, the state
legislature would need to decide
how to respond, which might entail
either scrapping the DSL or modifying the law so as to incorporate jury
fact-finding.
Second, and more subtly,
Cunningham may have important
ramifications for the federal sentencing system. This is because the
state is arguing that its system falls
within the constitutional safe harbor
recognized by Booker for discretionary sentencing regimes. The
state's argument is an invitation for
the Court to clarify its holding in
Booker and, in particular, to address
the post-Booker lower-court decisions (relied on by the state in its
brief) that accord presumptive
validity to sentences within the recommended guidelines range. In the
eyes of some commentators, the
federal courts of appeals have evis-
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cerated Booker by requiring compliance with the guidelines in all routine cases. For instance, the courts
of appeals have largely squelched a
post-Booker movement by district
court judges to soften the notoriously harsh federal guidelines for crack
offenses. It is arguable that such
decisions have moved the federal
system outside the safe harbor for
truly discretionary sentencing
regimes. Cunningham requires the
Court to define the safe harbor's
parameters with greater clarity. In
doing so, the Court may try to signal the federal courts of appeals that
they cannot demand as rigorous
compliance with the guidelines as
they have been doing.
Third, if the DSL regime is upheld,
then other states that are looking
for ways to implement some form of
presumptive sentencing without
jury fact-finding will have a clear
model to follow. A number of states,
including Ohio and New Jersey, are
still trying to deal with the fallout
from Blakely. Courts have declared
their sentencing systems unconstitutional, but their legislatures have
yet to respond. The California system, if constitutional, might prove
to be an attractive model for reform.
Finally, Cunningham offers the first
good opportunity to take the temperature of the new Roberts Court
on Apprendi issues. It is not yet
known whether Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito will follow
the lead of fellow conservative
Justices Scalia and Thomas (supporters of the Apprendi revolution)
or of their predecessors Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor (opponents of the revolution). There is also some uncertainty
over the views of Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg. Before he became a
Justice, Breyer played a key role in
drafting the federal sentencing
guidelines, which gives him a unique
personal stake in anything the Court

has to say about presumptive sentencing. He has opposed the
Apprendi revolution from the start.
With Booker, the federal guidelines
case, now behind the Court, some
commentators have speculated that
Breyer might be willing to make
peace with Apprendi and collaborate
with some of the pro-Apprendi
Justices in pushing the revolution in
new directions. On the other hand,
some commentators have wondered
whether Ginsburg, a supporter of
the revolution, is having second
thoughts. She surprised many
observers by joining Breyer's "remedy" opinion in Booker but did not
explain her vote. Judges and sentencing policy-makers will be reading with particular interest anything
she writes in Cunningham,just as
they will be anxious for any hints
about the views of Roberts, Alito,
and Breyer. The opinions of these
four Justices will determine whether
we are entering a period of retrenchment in the Court's sentencing
jurisprudence or whether the Court
will continue to reshape the criminal
justice landscape as dramatically as
it has done over the past six years.
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